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Abstract
This thesis explores the development of American policy in the Syrian Civil War, which
began in 2011 and has caused the world’s largest refugee crisis, among other
humanitarian issues. Through analyzing popular debates about U.S. foreign policy in
Syria, this project attempts to determine how the United States should have responded to
President Bashar al-Assad’s aggression towards his people in order to most effectively
alleviate suffering. The analysis finds that the United States under President Obama
missed a crucial opportunity to weaken Assad and prevent the suffering of millions of
Syrians. This paper also explores the present day implications of President Obama’s
mistakes in Syria, specifically referencing the lack of credibility that the United States
has in conflicts like that of Russian and Ukraine. The final chapter presents a bleak
outlook on the future of Syria and the possibilities for effective U.S. policy that would
depose Assad and end the War. Assad will stop at nothing to remain in power, yet as long
as he is in power, Syrians will see no peace.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
The Syrian people have been subjected to a deadly war for over a decade at the
hands of the Dictator Bashar al-Assad, and the United States has largely stood idly by.
Although the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and more recently the Russian
invasion of Ukraine have pushed coverage of the Syrian Civil War off the front page, the
conflict in Syria is far from over. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has
said that "it is impossible to fully fathom the extent of the devastation in Syria, but its
people have endured some of the greatest crimes the world has witnessed this century.”1
The United Nations has also released a statement calling the Syrian Civil War “the worst
man-made disaster since World War II.” 2 Over 590,000 people have been killed as a
result of the conflict, and at least 15,000 of them died while being tortured in prison by
the repressive Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad.3
This paper will seek to answer the following questions: How did the United States
respond to the Syrian Civil War, and to what extent was their response effective at
minimizing suffering and protecting U.S national security? How should the United States
continue to develop its Syria policy going forward? I will begin with a chapter on how
the Syrian conflict came to be and will also discuss international actors that have had
significant influences on the Assad regime’s ability to stay in power. Chapter 3 will detail
the United States’ involvement in Syria and examine how the American policy in Syria
1

Sherlock, Ruth, et al. “Syria's Civil War Started A Decade Ago. Here's Where It Stands.” NPR, NPR, 15
Mar. 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/15/976352794/syrias-civil-war-started-a-decade-ago-heres-where-it-stands.
2
Chughtai, Alia. “Syria's War: Ten Years – and Counting.” Arab Spring: 10 Years on News | Al Jazeera, Al
Jazeera, 18 Mar. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/syria-ten-years-of-war.
3
Ibid.
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was crafted. Chapter four will analyze some of the debates between the foremost scholars
on the Middle East and government officials about how the United States should have
responded to the Civil War in Syria. In order to better understand these debates, I
conducted interviews with Hagar Chemali who served as Director for Syria and Lebanon
at the National Security Council from 2010 to 2012 and read the opinions and memoirs of
many relevant government officials and scholars. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude
the paper by proposing suggestions for what U.S. policy in Syria should look like going
forward under the current Biden administration. This paper ultimately finds that the
United States missed a crucial opportunity in 2012 to have a meaningful effect on the
outcome of the Syrian Civil War, potentially saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of
people. Going forward, the United States lacks any feasible policy options that would
result in Assad losing power now that Russia has put its full military support behind the
country, and the opposition has been so thoroughly weakened.
The nation of Syria is approximately the same size as the State of Washington, but
only one quarter of its landmass is arable.4 In 2010, its population was around 24 million
people but that number has dropped to 17.5 million as of 2020 due to the Civil War.
American policy in Syria leading up to the Syrian Civil War was inconsistent. In 2002,
President George W. Bush included Syria in his “axis of evil” speech in which he listed
countries he was concerned were seeking weapons of mass destruction.5 Bush
4

Polk, W. R. (2013, December 10). Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to post-assad. The Atlantic.
Retrieved April 16, 2022, from
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-postassad/281989/.
5
Polk, W. R. (2013, December 10). Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to post-assad. The Atlantic.
Retrieved April 16, 2022, from
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-postassad/281989/
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specifically expressed concern that countries like Syria would allow terrorist
organizations to access these weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the United States has
considered Syria to be a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979 and has imposed strong
sanctions on the country since 2003.6 Although the relationship between Washington and
Damascus has been strained, the U.S. maintained an ambassador in the country up until
2011, when the Civil War began, making Syria the only country on the U.S.’s list of state
sponsored terrorists with which the U.S. retained diplomatic efforts.78 This inconsistent
Syrian policy continued with the start of the Civil War in 2011, as this paper will
examine.
American policymakers should be concerned with U.S. policy in Syria not only
because of the effects of the Civil War on American national security but also because the
conflict has had such devastating effects on the Syrian people, and the United States had
a responsibility to alleviate suffering to the best of its ability but failed to do so. The
Syrian Civil War created the world’s largest refugee crisis, forcing over 5.5 million
Syrians to leave their countries and become refugees, primarily in Egypt, Lebanon,
Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan.9 Today, one third of the world’s refugees are from Syria.10 The
war has also displaced 6.7 million Syrians within Syria.11 The refugee crisis has not only
6

Ibid.
Tabler, Andrew. In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. Lawrence
Hill Books, 2011, 13.
8
Only in 1986 did the U.S. briefly withdraw its Ambassador after it was revealed that Syria was involved
in an attempted terrorist attack on Israel. (See Tabler page 13).
9
Sherlock, Ruth, et al. “Syria's Civil War Started A Decade Ago. Here's Where It Stands.” NPR, NPR, 15
Mar. 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/15/976352794/syrias-civil-war-started-a-decade-ago-heres-where-it-stands.
10
Chughtai, Alia. “Syria's War: Ten Years – and Counting.” Arab Spring: 10 Years on News | Al Jazeera,
Al Jazeera, 18 Mar. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/syria-ten-years-of-war.
11
Sherlock, Ruth, et al. “Syria's Civil War Started A Decade Ago. Here's Where It Stands.” NPR, NPR, 15
Mar. 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/15/976352794/syrias-civil-war-started-a-decade-ago-heres-where-it-stands.
7
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affected Syrians but has also had political implications in European countries that have
accepted large numbers of refugees. A growing number of Muslim refugees in Europe
has led to the rise of Islamophobia, which in turn has increased the popularity of
extremist right-wing politicians.12
Children have suffered their own distinctive hardships as a result of the war: In
the first six months of 2018 alone, there were over 1,300 cases of harm against children;
60 percent of these were either maiming or murder.13 When school-aged children are not
given access to education due to the effects of the war, they are more likely to join
extremist groups. ISIS, a Muslim extremist group, has attempted to fill this educational
void by providing Syrians with their own schools that mainly focus on Islamic law and
prohibit subjects like history and sociology.14 15 The death and destruction in Syria
combined with western sanctions have also severely increased poverty. At least 80
percent of Syrians now live under the international poverty line.16 Shortages of food,
electricity and fuel are commonplace; over 9 million Syrians lack access to sufficient
food supplies.17 The Syrian Civil War has absolutely devastated the nation and has caused
dangers to American national security, yet no American President has taken decisive
action to end Bashar al-Assad’s war on his people.

12

Sherlock, Ruth, et al. “Syria's Civil War Started A Decade Ago. Here's Where It Stands.” NPR, NPR, 15
Mar. 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/15/976352794/syrias-civil-war-started-a-decade-ago-heres-where-it-stands.
13
Yassin, Nasser. “101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis.” Issam Fares Institute for Public
Policy and International Affairs, July 2019.
14
Ibid.
15
Monthly stipends provided by ISIS encourage children to attend these new schools.
16
Chughtai, Alia. “Syria's War: Ten Years – and Counting.” Arab Spring: 10 Years on News | Al Jazeera,
Al Jazeera, 18 Mar. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/syria-ten-years-of-war.
17
Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2: What Caused the Syrian Civil War?
In order to analyze the United States’ response to the Syrian Civil War and
determine future U.S. activity in the nation, we must first understand the causes and
effects of the war as well as the role that other international actors have played in the
conflict. The decade-long war is fueled in part by ethno religious tensions in the country
between the Sunni majority and the Alawite minority. 18 Syria is 10 percent Christian and
87 percent Muslim; 74 percent of Syrian Muslims are Sunni and 13 percent are Shia.19 In
1970, Hafez al-Assad, the Alawite defense minister, seized power from the ruling Baath
party and began a repressive regime that would last almost 30 years. Ethnic tensions
during his presidency reached a boiling point in February of 1982 when Sunni members
of the Muslim Brotherhood pushed Hafez al Assad’s security forces out of the city of
Hama, which had a high concentration of Muslim Brothers at the time. In retaliation, the
regime promptly bombed Hama and killed over 30,000 people.20
Hafez ruled with an iron fist until his death in 2000, at which point his
34-year-old son, Bashar al-Assad, whom he had been grooming, assumed the Presidency.
When it was announced that Bashar would be the next president, Syrians hoped that he
would deviate from his father’s authoritative practices and modernize the country. Bashar
was educated in London and had been an unassuming eye doctor prior to becoming
president. He even claimed that the reason he enjoyed being an eye doctor was because
“there was very little blood.” However, he quickly liberalized the previously state-run
18

Alawite is a sect of Shia Islam.
Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/#people-and-society.
20
Tabler, Andrew. In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. Lawrence
Hill Books, 2011.
19
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economy in a way that benefited only the crony capitalists close to his regime rather than
the majority of Syrians who were living in poverty.21 In his first ten years in power,
unemployment and poverty both increased, particularly among younger Syrians.22 To
make matters worse, Syria was faced with a severe drought that affected the livelihoods
of hundreds of thousands of farmers between 2006 and 2010, forcing many to become
climate refugees.23 While farmers were being forced off of their lands, those connected to
the regime like Assad’s first cousin Rami Makhlouf, were becoming significantly
wealthier under Assad’s regime. The billionaire Makhlouf owns Syriatel, a mobile
network provider company that is in control of an estimated 55 percent of the network
provider market.24 When Assad began to liberalize the economy, Makhlouf entered other
markets including real estate, construction, tourism, banking, insurance and transport, and
allegedly ended up controlling approximately 65 percent of Syria’s entire economy.25
Makhlouf’s corruption caused a chain reaction which ultimately led to the protests that
began the Syrian Civil War in 2011.
The Arab Spring Reaches Syria
While resentment towards Assad was growing, nations throughout the Middle
East were swept by protestors attempting to oust their respective oppressive regimes.
Beginning in Tunisia in 2010 when a fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself
21

Heydemann, Steven. “Pity the Nation: Assessing a Half-Century of Assadist Rule.” Brookings,
Brookings, 14 Dec.
2020,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/14/pity-the-nation-assessing-a-half-centur
y-of-assadist-rule/.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Shadid, Anthony. “Syrian Businessman Becomes Magnet for Anger and Dissent.” The New York Times,
The New York Times, 30 Apr. 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/asia/01makhlouf.html.
25
Heydemann, Steven. “Pity the Nation: Assessing a Half-Century of Assadist Rule.” Brookings,
Brookings, 14 Dec.
2020,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/14/pity-the-nation-assessing-a-half-centur
y-of-assadist-rule/.
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on fire to protest corruption in the government, the anti-government protests spread to
Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Oman, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Jordan, and Kuwait. In Tunisia, the protestors successfully coerced president Ben Ali to
step down. While protests were spreading in other parts of the Middle East, Assad
asserted that they would not reach Syria because he claimed his policies accurately
represented the desires of his people.26 His predictions ended up being deeply inaccurate.
The protests in Syria began in the Dara’a province, which had been hit
particularly hard by the drought, after government officials detained and tortured a group
of children who spray-painted graffiti that said “It’s your turn, doctor,” implying that
President Assad would be the next leader to be deposed. 27 As the story goes, Rami
Makhlouf’s company Syriatel wanted to obtain some land that was part of a school in
Dara’a so that Syriatel could build a new cell tower, but the Principal of the school
refused to allow Makhlouf to take the land, and so he sent some men to physically assault
her.28 This attack prompted a group of her students to graffiti, for which they were then
arrested.29 Anti-regime protests began and quickly spread after the parents of the detained
children were never informed about their children’s whereabouts. Unlike in Tunisia and
Egypt, these protests were about dignity and human rights more so than the state of the
Syrian economy, although Assad’s crony capitalism was certainly a factor as well. 30 The
government responded to the protests by firing into the crowd and arresting protesters,

26

Tabler, Andrew. In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. Lawrence
Hill Books, 2011.
27
Al Jazeera. “Timeline: How the Arab Spring Unfolded.” Arab Spring: 10 Years on News | Al Jazeera, Al
Jazeera, 14 Jan. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/14/arab-spring-ten-years-on.
28
Chemali, Hagar. Interview. Conducted by Sydney Heath. March 14th, 2022.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
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further infuriating the growing opposition.31 By early April these nonviolent protests
spread across the country, and the Syrian government had deployed tanks to crush
protests by the end of the month.32 By July, at least 100,000 people across Syria had
joined the anti-regime protests, and over 600 people had been killed by regime forces.33
In a speech addressed to the nation on January 10th, 2012, President Assad promised to
not give in to the “terrorists” and to continue defending his regime with an “iron fist.”34
On February 3rd, government forces killed over 200 people in a single day when they
attacked Homs, which was the heart of the anti-regime uprising at the time.35
The Opposition Movement
Given that Assad is Alawite, it makes sense that the majority of the protesters
were Sunni Muslims, revealing the sectarian element of the conflict. Initially there were
some working-and-middle-class Alawites who supported the protesters and non-Alawites
who supported the government. This type of cross-cutting cleavage would all but
disappear as the war progressed. Not long after the protests began in Dara’a, rebel
militias began to form against the government. At the height of the war, there were 13
main opposition groups operating separately. However, according to some sources there
were as many as 1,200 smaller rebel groups.36 The Free Syrian Army, which was mainly
made up of soldiers who defected from the Syrian army, was one of the larger groups,
31

Al Jazeera. “Timeline: How the Arab Spring Unfolded.” Arab Spring: 10 Years on News | Al Jazeera, Al
Jazeera, 14 Jan. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/14/arab-spring-ten-years-on.
32
Ibid.
33
Yacoubian, Mona. “Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising against Assad.” United States Institute of Peace,
12 Mar. 2021, https://www.usip.org/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad.
34
Al Jazeera. “Timeline: How the Arab Spring Unfolded.” Arab Spring: 10 Years on News | Al Jazeera, Al
Jazeera, 14 Jan. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/14/arab-spring-ten-years-on.
35
Yacoubian, Mona. “Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising against Assad.” United States Institute of Peace,
12 Mar. 2021, https://www.usip.org/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad.
36
Gilsinan, Kathy. “The Confused Person's Guide to the Syrian Civil War.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media
Company, 16 Nov. 2015.
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with as many as 50,000 members by 2013.37 Local militias, however, generally did not
accept the authority it claimed to have over the opposition movement. Jabhat Al-Nusra
was perhaps the strongest and most effective group of opposition fighters and was
Islamist by nature.38 In theory, the overwhelming Sunni majority in the country should
have been able to unite against the significantly smaller Alawite minority, but this did not
come to be. There were several important reasons why the opposition movement was not
able to effectively coordinate or cooperate to defeat the Assad regime. The first of these
was the culture of distrust that Assad’s rule had established in the country. Even before
the beginning of the Civil War, Syrian citizens were not allowed to complain about the
government, and anyone could be a spy, including unassuming taxi drivers looking to
make some extra money as informers and even one’s own neighbors.39 Given this lack of
trust, it was difficult for different opposition groups to work together. Additionally, each
group had a different interest even though they all needed to reach their distinctive goals
by overthrowing Assad. Beginning early on in the war, they were too focused on their
own individual interests and end goals and failed to realize that they needed to unite to
take down Assad before they could determine what the future of Syria would look like. 40
In an interview, Hagar Chemali, the former Director for Syria and Lebanon at the
National Security Council, explained that the United States would attend conferences in
Geneva with leaders from the various opposition groups, and the leaders would spend the
majority of the time arguing over matters such as which of them would become the next

37

The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “Syrian Civil War.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc., 31 Mar. 2020.
38
Rhodes, Ben. The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House. Random House, 2019.
39
Chemali, Hagar. Interview. Conducted by Sydney Heath. March 14th, 2022.
40
Ibid.
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prime minister rather than discussing how to defeat Assad, who was the most imminent
threat.41
Indiscriminate Violence and Chemical Weapons
The Assad regime has employed the use of overwhelming violence against
civilians in order to weaken the opposition movement to the point of surrender. Assad’s
violence has taken the form of torturing political prisoners, bombing hospitals, and using
chemical weapons on civilians. Although Assad denies the use of torture in his prisons,
the New York Times has released Syrian government memos that mention deaths due to
torture and awful prison conditions.42 The government’s targeting of hospitals during
airstrikes was exposed by the Physicians for Human Rights group, which has released
reports of 46 government attacks on hospitals in the northwest of Syria, and 14 of these
hospitals were on a list provided to the Assad regime by the United Nations. 43 On the list,
the UN included the locations of hospitals in Syria with the hope that Assad and his allies
would avoid them during his bombing campaigns.44 Instead of complying with the UN’s
request, Assad chose to target the most vulnerable population of civilians, pressuring the
opposition to surrender. Since the start of the conflict in 2011, 890 medical professionals
have been killed in 578 bombings of health facilities.45 Since the beginning of the war,
government militias have killed over 11,000 civilians, including almost 2,000 children,
using over 82,000 barrel bombs.46 Assad’s forces even resorted to bombing the funerals

41

Ibid.
Allen, Opinion by Jonathan. “Terrorizing Civilians and Bombing Hospitals Is a Core Part of Assad's
Strategy.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Sept. 2019.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
“In Nine Years, the Syrian Regime Has Dropped Nearly 82,000 Barrel Bombs, Killing 11,087 Civilians,
Including 1,821 Children - Syrian Arab Republic.” ReliefWeb, 15 Apr. 2021,
42

Heath 11

of their victims in order to target those they believed were supportive of the opposition
movement.47
Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians has been one of his most
egregious war crimes. Although Syria has signed the Geneva Gas Protocol, which
prohibits “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gasses, and of all analogous
liquids,” this technically only applies to wars among separate countries and therefore
does not prevent the government from using chemical weapons on its own citizens.48 The
Assad regime’s first reported use of chemical weapons was on December 23rd, 2012,
when seven people in Homs died from a mysterious poisonous gas.49 In March 2013,
there was another reported incident in which 25 people were killed by chemical weapons
in Damascus and Aleppo; the Syrian government blamed the opposition for these
attacks.50 Despite these claims, one comprehensive report on Syria’s chemical weapons
usage found that only two percent of chemical weapon attacks can be attributed to the
opposition, and more specifically to ISIS.51 In August 2013, the government perpetrated
another large scale attack that killed 1,429 people, including a number of non-combatants
and 426 children.52 The chemical used in the attack was a nerve agent called Sarin that is

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/nine-years-syrian-regime-has-dropped-nearly-82000-barrelbombs-killing.
47
Power, Samantha. The Education of an Idealist: a Memoir. Del St., an Imprint of William Morrow, 2021,
596.
48
Hurd, Ian. “Saving Syria: International Law Is Not the Answer.” Opinions | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 27
Aug. 2013,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/8/27/saving-syria-international-law-is-not-the-answer#:~:text=Ye
t%20in%201953%20Syria%20did,These%20are%20important%20commitments.
49
“Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2021 | Arms Control
Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
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20 times more toxic than cyanide.53 As this paper will examine later, a United Nations
resolution in 2013 required Syria to destroy its chemical weapons equipment, but this had
little effect because 91.5 percent of the chemical weapons attacks have been chlorine
bombs, and chlorine plants were not required to be destroyed under the UN resolution
because of chlorine’s quotidian uses.54 These indiscriminate chemical weapons attacks,
which seem to deliberately target not only the rebel militias but also noncombatants,
including children, have served to weaken the already-divided opposition movement.
The Role of the Islamic State
One of Assad’s most effective tactics has been his indirect support for jihadist
groups such as ISIS and the Army of Islam, who initially made up only a small fraction
of the opposition. He has supported these groups by releasing prisoners known to be
affiliated with extremist groups, purchasing gas and oil from territories controlled by the
terrorist organizations, and largely sparing extremist rebels from his bombing
campaigns.55 In doing so, he effectively portrayed the entire opposition movement as
extremist in nature, ensuring that countries in the West would be hesitant to intervene on
behalf of the rebels and securing the loyalty of Shia across the country whose existence
was threatened by Sunni extremist groups like ISIS.
Although Assad may have only purchased oil from terrorist groups out of
necessity (as he would likely claim), this nonetheless proves Assad’s willingness to work
53

Allen, Opinion by Jonathan. “Terrorizing Civilians and Bombing Hospitals Is a Core Part of Assad's
Strategy.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Sept. 2019.
54
Lombardo, Clare. “More than 300 Chemical Attacks Launched during Syrian Civil War, Study Says.”
NPR, NPR, 17 Feb. 2019,
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/17/695545252/more-than-300-chemical-attacks-launched-during-syrian-civilwar-study-says.
55
Becker, Michael. “When Terrorists and Target Governments Cooperate: the Case of Syria.” Perspectives
on Terrorism, vol. 9, no. 1, 2015, pp. 95–103. JSTOR. Accessed 13 May 2020.
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with jihadist groups, despite his anti-ISIS rhetoric. An ISIS fighter gave further evidence
of Assad’s indirect support for extremist groups when he said: “We were confident that
the regime would not bomb us.”56 The Assad regime focused its violence
overwhelmingly on the more moderate groups of rebel fighters along with civilians. And
finally, Assad’s most direct form of support for extremists came in the form of releasing
prisoners whom he knew to be jihadists.57 An interesting example of this phenomenon is
the case of Zahran Alloush. In 2009, Alloush, a known Sunni fundamentalist, was
arrested and sent to prison in Damascus during a crackdown on Sunni extremism across
the country.58 Assad released Alloush from prison in 2011, just as the Civil War was
beginning to heat up. Alloush went on to form the Army of Islam, a Salafi fundamentalist
militia group that became a powerful part of the opposition movement.59
What exactly did Assad gain from his indirect support for Sunni fundamentalist
groups who wanted to overthrow his government? There were three main outcomes that
have significantly contributed to Assad’s success in the Civil War. Firstly, through
supporting the growth of terrorist organizations, Assad was able to frame the protesters as
extremists, which discouraged foreign powers such as the United States from intervening
on the side of the rebels. This was largely successful given that the U.S. terminated its aid
for the rebels in 2013.60 The U.S. then went a step further and brought the war on terror to
Syria, carrying out airstrikes against ISIS in 2014 with the support of Assad. 61 A total of
56

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Lund, Aron, et al. “The Syrian Rebel Who Tried to Build an Islamist Paradise.” POLITICO Magazine, 31
Mar. 2017.
59
Barnard, Anne. “Powerful Syrian Rebel Leader Reported Killed in Airstrike.” The New York Times, The
New York Times, 25 Dec. 2015.
60
Becker, Michael. “When Terrorists and Target Governments Cooperate: the Case of Syria.” Perspectives
on Terrorism, vol. 9, no. 1, 2015, pp. 95–103. JSTOR. Accessed 13 May 2020.
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nine countries have worked together to bomb ISIS in Syria, thereby indirectly supporting
Assad’s regime in the Civil War.62 A second tactical reason for encouraging the growth
and development of terrorist organizations is that it has divided the opposition movement,
thereby weakening it. Conflict between different groups in the opposition has at times
become more common than fighting between the opposition and the regime.63 Not only
are Sunni fundamentalist groups at odds with the more moderate militias, the extremist
groups are also in conflict with one another. For many moderate Sunni Syrians, the
fundamentalist lifestyle and beliefs of groups like ISIS, such as political Islam and
conservative dress for women, are perhaps even more unappealing than those of the
current Syrian regime.64 There is also a perception that some extremist groups have ties to
Assad, given his aforementioned support for them, which makes moderate groups
hesitant to work with them.65 Regarding conflict between Sunni fundamentalist groups,
the hostility between ISIS and Zahran Alloush’s Army of Islam is a good example of the
effectiveness of Assad’s decision to release Alloush from prison. These two organizations
see each other as competitors for power, and their clashes have effectively weakened both
groups relative to the strength of the Assad regime. 66
The final factor that likely motivated Assad to support Sunni fundamentalist
organizations was his need to ensure that Alawites and other non-Sunnis would remain
loyal to him throughout the war. By making certain that the face of the opposition was
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Sunni extremist and therefore anti-Shia, this would deter Alawites, Christians, and Druze
from finding a place in the opposition.67 These minority groups would see the conflict as
an existential threat and feel that they needed to support Assad.
International Actors in the Conflict
One of Assad’s most powerful weapons in the Syrian Civil War, if not the most
powerful, has been the support he has received from Russia, Iran and China. Not only
have these countries helped to fund the Assad regime, they have also provided troops and
weapons, trained Assad’s army, and acted as important diplomatic allies in the United
Nations. In 2011, when the UN Security Council attempted to pass a resolution that
would have denounced Assad’s use of violence, China and Russia vetoed the resolution,
preventing its enactment.68 Russia has exercised its veto power 12 times in the UN
Security Council to protect Assad since the beginning of the War. 69 Additionally, when
the European Union put sanctions on Syria in order to weaken Assad, Russia and Iran
provided economic support that counteracted the effect of the sanctions.70 Iran loaned
Syria $4.6 billion, and Putin printed Syrian pounds within Russia for Assad. 71
Russia
Russia's decision to back Assad in the Syrian Civil War can be traced back to the
“Putin Doctrine” written in 2008.72 This doctrine focused on Russia’s aim to suppress the
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U.S.’s influence around the world and to increase Russia’s regional power.73 Syria is
Russia’s last remaining sphere of influence in the region.7475 Not only is Putin concerned
with losing leverage in the Middle East, he also fears that the United States will replace
Putin’s regime with one friendly to the United States if given the opportunity. This fear is
not unfounded; the United States had done so in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq in the early
2000s.76 Later in the Syrian conflict Moscow lost its foothold in Ukraine following the
2014 Ukrainian revolution, in which a pro-United States government took power, giving
Putin further reason to fear the growing U.S. influence.77 As a result, Putin currently has
an estimated 5,000 troops stationed in Syria who are fighting on behalf of Assad as well
as an airbase in Hmeimim and military bases across the country.78 Putin has also framed
Russia’s involvement in the conflict as a means to defeat ISIS, however Russian airstrikes
have disproportionately killed civilians and moderate rebel militias rather than ISIS
fighters.79 The Syrian Network for Human Rights has estimated the number of civilian
deaths since 2011 to be 226,247, and Russian airstrikes have been responsible for
anywhere between 6,500 and 8,400 of these deaths.80
Iran
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Like Russia, Iran’s support for the Assad regime stems from its desire to limit
U.S. influence around the world and the fact that Iran has few other Shia allies in the
region.81 Iran seeks to limit the expansion of the Sunni Islamic state in Syria, so it has an
interest in supporting the Alawite Assad regime. Iranian support for the pro-regime
Syrian military has taken many forms; the Iranian government backs Hezbollah, a
Lebanese terrorist organization that has provided significant military aid and
approximately 8,000 fighters to Assad’s forces since 2013. 82 Iran has also supplied Assad
with weapons as well as 3,000 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds
Force.83 Reports say that Iran’s aid to Assad has cost Iran $15 billion per year.84 One
particularly calculating way in which Iran has supported the Assad regime is through the
engineering of population swaps in which Shia Muslims from Lebanon, Iraq and other
parts of Syria are sent into areas of Syria that were previously occupied by Sunni
Muslims prior to the war.85
China
China is interested in maintaining a working relationship with Assad in order to
secure trade deals and include Syria in its Belt and Road Initiative. In 2017, Assad
announced that China, Russia and Iran would be given priority to rebuild infrastructure
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whenever the Syrian war ends, and China has since promised to invest $2 billion in the
country.86 Apart from this main economic interest, China is also worried about the
Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an extremist organization made up of Uighur Muslims that
has a presence in Idlib in Syria. The Chinese government has an interest in defeating
extremist Uighur Muslims in Syria before they make their way back to China where they
have historically carried out terrorist attacks.87 China has supported the Assad regime
both through pledging billions of dollars to support future infrastructure projects as well
as through its current investments in Syria’s petroleum industry.88
International Organizations’ Response to the Syrian Civil War
The international community, with the exception of Russia, Iran and China, has
taken some steps to weaken Assad’s power in Syria. On February 24th, 2012, the
“Friends of Syria” meeting convened and was attended by over 70 countries and
international organizations.89 They refused to recognize Assad as the legitimate leader of
Syria and demanded that humanitarian aid be allowed to reach civilians.90 Friends of
Syria has continued to convene occasionally to coordinate support for the rebel groups.
The United Nations has also attempted to bring about peace in Syria. Kofi Annan was the
UN special envoy to Syria at the start of the Civil War. In 2012, he wrote a six-point
peace plan, which was supported by the UN Security Council, that called for a
UN-mediated cease-fire, humanitarian aid, and freedom of press and protest, to name a
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few of his requests.91 In what would become a concerning pattern, the Assad regime
accepted the reforms that Kofi Annan put forward but did not ultimately implement
them.92 In the words of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon: “The hand extended to turn
away from violence in favor of dialogue and diplomacy – as spelled out in the six-point
plan – has not been not taken, even though it still remains the best hope for the people of
Syria.”93 In April of the same year, the UN mediated a ceasefire between the government
and the opposition fighters, but it also proved unsuccessful almost immediately.94 The
vast majority of concerted efforts on the part of the international community proved
ineffective at putting an end to Assad’s indiscriminate violence against his citizens.
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CHAPTER 3: The Development of the U.S. Policy
towards Syria (2011-2020)
The Geopolitical Context
The United States’ policy towards the Syrian Civil War was largely shaped by the
American people’s disinterest in any further military action in the Middle East following
the failed Iraq and Libya interventions. This nationwide anti-intervention sentiment
influenced President Obama’s decisions to refrain from playing a more active role in
Syria. In 2016, President Obama was asked what he considered to be the “worst mistake”
of his presidency. He answered: “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think
was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.”95 So what exactly happened in Libya
and where did the United States go wrong? The Libyan Civil war took place in 2011 not
long before the start of the Syrian Civil War. Dictator Muammar Gaddafi was massacring
his people, and the United States under President Obama decided to intervene for strictly
humanitarian reasons.96 As Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense in 2011, stated:
“[Gaddafi] was not a threat to us anywhere. He was a threat to his own people, and that
was about it.”97 The invasion of Libya under Obama ended up having rather disastrous
results, including the death of two American diplomats, Christopher Stevens and Sean
Smith, at Benghazi. Not only did these two deaths affect the American people’s
perception of military intervention in the Middle East region, they also became an area of
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controversy and criticism that haunted the Obama administration.98 The legacy of U.S.
intervention in Libya was a failed state, the proliferation of extremist groups and another
Civil War in 2014 because, as Obama himself admits, his administration failed to
consider the future of democracy in Libya following the defeat of Gadhafi.99 When
considering whether or not to take a similar course of action in the humanitarian crisis
that was evolving in Syria, Obama certainly considered the result of U.S. intervention in
Libya. As UN Ambassador Samantha Power points out in her memoir: “ Libya actually
seemed far more straightforward than Syria, which had a pre-war population that was
three times larger and had deep societal cleavages. Although Syria was 74 percent Sunni
Muslim, the Assad family and much of the governing class came from the minority
Alawite sect.”100 Later, when the United States was considering a military response to
Assad’s chemical weapons use, Russian members of the United Nations reminded the
world of the results of the United States’ actions in Libya. 101
The other conflict which weighed heavily on Obama and influenced his Syria
policy was the Iraq war. In 2003, President George W. Bush led the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
claiming that Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, possessed “weapons of mass destruction.”
The Iraq war took the lives of 4,550 American soldiers, and to this day there is still a U.S.
military presence in the country.102 Ultimately it was determined that there were no
98

McKernan, Bethan. “War in Libya: How Did It Start, Who Is Involved and What Happens next?” The
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 18 May 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next.
99
Ibid.
100
Power, Samantha. The Education of an Idealist: a Memoir. Del St., an Imprint of William Morrow,
2021, 608.
101
Ibid.
102
Brown, Daniel. “The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Have Killed at Least 500,000 People, According to a
New Report That Breaks down the Toll.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 9 Nov. 2018,
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-many-people-have-been-killed-in-iraq-and-afghanistan#6951-us-mili
tary-deaths-1.

Heath 22

weapons of mass destruction in the country. The legacy of this faulty intelligence became
an issue when the Obama administration was trying to determine whether or not to react
to Assad’s use of chemical weapons. Obama’s intelligence community felt they needed to
be extremely cautious before declaring definitively that Assad had used chemical
weapons against his own people because of the intelligence failure in Iraq.103
Additionally, one of President Obama’s campaign promises was the removal of troops
from Iraq.104 The prospect of starting another war in the Middle East was certainly not
one he would look favorably upon.
Overall there seemed to be a general sense of exasperation among Americans,
many of whom felt that President Obama should stay out of the Middle East. Ben
Rhodes, President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor, wrote in his memoir:
In Lebanon, young men set fire to American fast food restaurants. In Tunis, four
people were killed at the U.S. embassy when an angry mob climbed the walls and
raised a black flag…In Afghanistan, the Taliban launched an attack that killed two
Marines. Meanwhile, the caskets of the four Americans killed in Benghazi were
returned to Andrews Air Force Base. 105
These events, while not huge in scale, added up and gave the American people
the perception that the United States should not involve itself in the Middle East. Rhodes
describes the dilemma that President Obama faced, writing:
[Obama] had to respond to this awful event in Syria while bearing the additional
weight of the war in Iraq which caused his own intelligence community to be
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cautious, his military to be wary of a slippery slope, his closest allies to distrust
U.S. military adventures in the Middle East, the press to be more skeptical of
presidential statements, the public to oppose U.S. war overseas, and Congress to
see matters of war and peace as political issues to be exploited.106
All of these were significant factors that ultimately influenced the president’s decision to
not take a more active role in the conflict in Syria.
The Beginning Years of U.S. Policy on Syria: 2011-2012
Given the geopolitical context at the time, President Obama’s policy on Syria
during the first year of the Syrian Civil War centered around harsh statements and
sanctions, but did not go any further. On April 29th, a little over a month after the start of
the war, President Obama issued Executive Order 13572, which declared:
The Government of Syria's human rights abuses, including those related to the
repression of the people of Syria, manifested most recently by the use of violence
and torture against, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of, peaceful protestors by
police, security forces, and other entities that have engaged in human rights
abuses, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States.107
This executive order also placed sanctions on many officials connected to the
Assad regime including Assad’s brother, Maher, and his cousin, both members of Assad’s
security forces.108 The order additionally sanctioned Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as
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punishment for “providing material support to the Syrian government related to the
crackdown,” which referred in part to the software that Iran allegedly gave Assad that
helped him track dissidents through social media.109
In the month following the executive order, President Obama gave a speech
about United States involvement in the Arab spring in which he stated: “We have
consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the
way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President
Assad to step aside.”110 He followed up this statement with strong sanctions on President
Assad, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, and the Defense and Interior Ministers.111
The result of all of this pressure from the United States and other Western countries
combined with increasing internal protests led President Assad to make some
pro-democracy promises that he would not ultimately keep. Assad laid out a number of
reforms, such as increased freedom of press and new election laws but claimed that they
would go into effect months into the future.112 As it became clear that Assad had no
intention of implementing any real reforms, the United States continued to impose
sanctions and release statements. On August 18, 2011, President Obama officially called
for Assad to renounce the presidency and then implemented harsh sanctions on the Syrian
Central Bank and banned the import of petroleum from Syria.113 While the United States’
banning of oil imports from Syria did not have a significant effect on the Syrian
economy, the European Union ended up following suit. Given that Syria had exported
109

Ibid.
Rhodes, Ben. The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House. Random House, 2019.
111
Tabler, Andrew. In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. Lawrence
Hill Books, 2011.
112
Ibid.
113
Power, Samantha. The Education of an Idealist: a Memoir. Del St., an Imprint of William Morrow,
2021.
110

Heath 25

over 92 percent of its petroleum to countries in the European Union in the year prior,
these sanctions did substantial damage to its economy.114 However, as this paper will
explain, sanctions were not able to be nearly detrimental enough to compel Assad to
create any meaningful change or come to the negotiating table.
The Red Line
The most controversial part of President Obama’s Syria policy was certainly the
“red line” incident in which the Obama Administration failed to follow through on a
threat they made to Assad regarding Assad’s chemical weapon usage. In July 2012,
President Obama was asked what it would take for him to pursue military action in Syria.
He answered: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime that a red line for us is we
start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That
would change my calculus.”115 In other words, all other forms of mass murder were not
deemed worthy of intervention by the Obama administration but the use of chemical
weapons would cross a “red line” that would in theory incite the U.S. to intervene
militarily. Despite President Obama’s warning, Assad went ahead and perpetrated a
chemical weapons attack against civilians on December 23rd, 2012.116 The United States
intelligence community took months to officially conclude that chemical weapons had
been used in Syria. Their hesitance to do so earlier was one of the legacies of the Iraq
war, which the United States waged based on false reports about weapons of mass
destruction.117 It was not until April 25 th, 2013, that the Obama administration informed
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Congress that the U.S. intelligence community had strong reason to believe that sarin, a
deadly nerve agent, had been used by Assad. 118 After these findings were released to the
public, President Obama requested that the United Nations conduct its own independent
investigation into whether or not Assad had perpetrated these sarin attacks. 119 This was in
part because Obama was aware that the rest of the world might not trust U.S. intelligence
reports, especially given what had happened in Iraq, and he hoped the UN investigation
would appear more objective.120At this point, many Americans were questioning whether
or not President Obama would follow through on his threat to Assad. When a reporter
asked Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor, if Obama believed the “red line”
had been crossed, Rhodes responded:
We are continuing to do further work to establish a definitive judgment as to
whether or not the red line has been crossed… President Assad and those around
him should know that the world is going to continue to carefully monitor this
issue and bring forward information as we have it… Were he to undertake any
additional use [of chemical weapons] he would be doing so under very careful
monitoring from us and the International Community.121
Exactly four days after Rhodes released this statement at an April press briefing, the
Assad regime once again shamelessly attacked its citizens with chemical weapons.122 The
United Nations agreed to conduct their independent investigation in Syria, but when
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investigators tried to enter the country, Assad would not permit them to cross the border
into Syria.123
On June 13th, the Obama administration finally formally acknowledged that Assad
had crossed the “red line.” Ben Rhodes released a statement saying that they had “high
confidence” in their intelligence reports from Syria.124 The first commitment President
Obama made following this formal acknowledgement was a promise to arm and train the
moderate branches of the oppositional movement in Syria.125 In a press conference where
Rhodes was to explain what President Obama’s response would be to Assad’s violation of
the “red line”, he was not able to give specifics about the new policy because it was
classified information. As Samantha Power points out: “Since even Assad didn't know
the particulars of the cost he would be bearing, he seemed unlikely to be deterred from
carrying out further attacks.”126 On August 18 th, 20 United Nations investigators were
finally allowed to enter Damascus to conduct their report. In a demonstration of
incredible audacity, Assad conducted another extremely large chemical weapons attack
on his people just three days after the UN investigators arrived.127 Assad was yet to be
deterred by any of the United States’ sanctions, strong statements or support for the
opposition and was certainly not concerned by the threat of a United Nations report.
Contemplating U.S. Military Action in Syria
Now that President Obama had essentially threatened military action against
Assad, he felt he had to follow through and initially planned to launch a military
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operation on August 25th. 128 The White House had explained that ousting Assad was not
their goal; their only aim was to force Assad to stop using chemical weapons. 129 There
were, however, several issues to consider regarding U.S. military action in Syria. The
first of these was the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon’s refusal to pull the UN
investigators out of the country. Ki-moon did not want the UN to be seen as supportive of
the U.S.’s military plans and additionally wanted to finish the investigation that had been
initially delayed due to Assad’s failure to comply. With the UN investigators in Syria,
President Obama feared that any retaliatory American air strikes might put them in
danger, or Assad would use the UN investigators as human shields. 130 By now, Assad and
his allies had grown quite supportive of the UN’s presence in Syria because they realized
the implications of the investigators’ departure. 131 While the UN remained in Syria,
Assad had time to hide any weapons he did not want the United States to bomb. Another
issue that President Obama faced was how he would justify military intervention in Syria
under international law. International law permits one state to invade another under three
circumstances: 1) Self-defense, 2) When there is consent by both states, and 3) When the
UN Security Council authorizes an invasion.132 Putin would no doubt veto any military
invasion of Syria given his alliance with Assad, which left Obama unsure how to justify
the intervention. Ultimately, White House lawyers suggested that because the Assad
regime had already violated many significant international commitments, a U.S. invasion
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would be justified, as had been true for the case of Kosovo.133 It was deeply important
that the U.S. preserve the international standard against chemical weapons use, given the
indiscriminate nature of their targets. Another problem that made President Obama
hesitant to bomb Syrian chemical weapons factories was the danger that the toxic fumes
would leak out and kill thousands of Syrian civilians.134 Bombing other military targets,
on the other hand, would allow Assad to continue to gas his people, perhaps in retaliation
for American involvement and aid to the opposition groups. Apart from these concerns,
Obama was also uninterested in a large military operation in Syria and was worried that a
more targeted operation would be forced to expand as Assad continued to kill his people
in unforeseen ways, to which the U.S. would have to respond to maintain its credibility.135
Despite all of President Obama’s apprehension about military involvement, he was fully
prepared to begin air strikes without seeking Congressional approval once the UN
investigators left Syria.
Domestic Backlash Against the Military Operation in Syria
As President Obama was forced to delay the military operation in Syria, this
allowed many members of Congress to express their concerns over a U.S. invasion of
Syria. 98 Republican and 18 Democratic Members of Congress sent President Obama a
letter stating that Assad posed no direct threat to U.S. national security interests and that
without Congressional approval, it would be unconstitutional to start a war because it
would violate the separation of powers.136 The Speaker of the House, John Boehner,
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wrote his own letter in which he asked President Obama to consider the potential
consequences of U.S. military intervention in Syria. His letter reads:
It will take Presidential leadership and a clear explanation of our policy, our
interests, and our objectives to gain public and Congressional support for any
military action against Syria…After spending the last 12 years fighting those who
seek to harm our fellow citizens, our interests, and our allies, we all have a greater
appreciation of what it means for our country to enter into conflict. It will take
that public support and Congressional will to sustain the Administration’s efforts,
and our military, as well as their families, deserve to have the confidence that we
collectively have their backs — and a thorough strategy in place.137
The letter also inquired about the total costs of the operation and why the President felt he
could invade another country without Congressional approval: “It is essential you address
on what basis any use of force would be legally justified and how the justification
comports with the exclusive authority of Congressional authorization under Article 1 of
the Constitution.”138All of this sudden backlash from Congress combined with the fact
that the UK had just voted not to join the United States’ airstrike operation in Syria led
President Obama to reconsider his Syria strategy.139
The UN investigators finally left Syria on August 30th, and their report confirmed
what the United States and much of the world already knew: Assad had used Sarin gas
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against his people.140 Instead of immediately launching a military operation as he had
previously planned, President Obama decided to seek authorization from Congress. He
knew that if he made the unilateral decision to invade Syria, he would risk impeachment
and would not have the backing of Republicans, making it difficult to maintain a
successful military operation in Syria.141 However, if he were able to obtain official
approval from Congress, then the invasion would be less political and more likely to be
sustainable and seen as legitimate.142 According to the U.S. Constitution, only Congress
can declare war, but as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. military, the President may
pursue short term military operations without authorization from Congress. The War
Powers Resolution of 1973 limited the President’s power as Commander in Chief. One of
its stipulations was that the President must remove U.S. troops within 60 days after
invading a foreign country if he or she does not have Congressional approval to begin a
war. Without Congressional approval, President Obama feared that Assad would realize
that the U.S. military would be forced to leave in under two months. President Obama
said on the matter: “If Assad thinks he can wait us out, that's in nobody's interest.”143
Although many members of Congress did not support U.S. military action in Syria,
President Obama hoped that there were some factors that would sway those who were
undecided. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been vocal in
his support for a U.S. invasion of Syria, meaning that President Obama had the backing
of the powerful lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
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(AIPAC).144 Additionally, President Obama hoped that the strong anti-Iran sentiment
would push many politicians to support the invasion given Iran’s support for Assad. 145
Ultimately, his administration’s calculus proved incorrect, and it became clear that they
would simply not have sufficient support in Congress; they decided there was no reason
to proceed with the vote and doing so would be politically disadvantageous. John Kerry
advised President Obama: “It is no exaggeration to say, if you lose with Congress, having
already told the world you are going to use military force, people will proclaim the
effective end of your second term.”146 Since the red line incident, President Obama has
said of his decision:
The perception was that my credibility was at stake, that America's credibility
was at stake. And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, I knew,
would cost me politically. And the fact that I was able to pull back from the
immediate pressures and think through in my own mind what was in America's
interest, not only with respect to Syria but also with respect to our democracy, was
as tough a decision as I've made, and I believe ultimately it was the right decision
to make.147
Instead of pursuing airstrikes in Syria, the Obama Administration took a more
diplomatic approach that ended up being wholly insufficient. On September 6th, he met
with Russian President Putin to try to convince him to force Assad to dismantle his
chemical weapons collection. At this point, President Obama had not yet announced that
he had abandoned his plans to begin a military operation in Syria. In a press conference
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not long after, John Kerry was asked what Assad could do to avoid a U.S. invasion. He
answered: “[Assad] could turn over every bit of his weapons to the international
community within the next week. Turn it over, all of it, without delay . . . But he isn’t
about to do it, and it can’t be done, obviously.”148 That same day, much to everyone’s
surprise, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called Kerry and explained that
President Putin would work with the United States to destroy Assad’s chemical
weapons.149 This partnership resulted in UN Resolution 2118, which “determin[ed] that
the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.”150 The Resolution also:
endorses the decision of the OPCW Executive Council 27 September 2013, which
contains special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab
Republic’s chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof and calls
for its full implementation in the most expedient and safest manner.151
As a result of the Resolution, Assad’s chemical weapons equipment was destroyed in
twenty-one different locations, and weapons that had been hidden were removed and
neutralized in the ocean by Danish and Norwegian ships.152 Ultimately, just seven months
after the UN Resolution, the Assad regime began creating new chemical weapons using
chlorine and has perpetrated attacks as recently as 2019.153
The Role of ISIS in the U.S.’s Syria Policy
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Beginning in 2014, President Obama had a renewed interest in a U.S. military
intervention in Syria due to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an
Islamic extremist group. However, the Obama Administration’s main priority was no
longer supporting the opposition movement and stopping Assad from using chemical
weapons; it was almost entirely to defeat ISIS, which was perceived as a serious national
security threat to the United States. ISIS was originally an offshoot of Al Qaeda and was
formed in Iraq in 2004. After the Civil War began in Syria in 2011, ISIS took advantage
of the instability of the country and began spreading and increasing terrorist attacks in
both Syria and Iraq.154 In August of 2014, the United States began “Operation Inherent
Resolve”, in which they carried out over 8,000 airstrikes against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.155
By 2018, there were 2,000 American troops stationed in Syria. 156 Apart from conducting
airstrikes, the United States also announced they would train members of the Syrian
opposition movement both to fight ISIS and also to defeat the Assad regime. 157
Ultimately, the U.S. government identified 7,000 members of the opposition who were
good candidates to be trained by the U.S. military, but they only ended up working with
54 fighters even after announcing they would train 5,400.158 Despite the United States’
aggressive military campaign, ISIS continued to spread throughout Syria. While the U.S.
was engaged in their battle with ISIS, the Assad regime claimed that the entire opposition
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movement was made up of violent extremists. Using this logic, he attempted to justify his
violent repression tactics against the opposition.159 Assad’s government forces were
slowly growing weaker and weaker, until 2015 when Russian President Vladimir Putin
began sending military aid to Syria to help Assad defeat ISIS (and the opposition
movement); this new addition to the conflict made President Obama even less likely to
intervene and begin a proxy war with Russia.
Removal of U.S. Troops from Syria
The Syrian Kurds, allies of the United States, were instrumental in the United
States’ fight against ISIS. They were joined by the Arab Syrians to create the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), which was heavily supported by the United States.160 Together
with the SDF, the United States continued to weaken the Islamic State in Syria. In
December of 2018, U.S. President Trump announced that the Islamic State was defeated,
and he began suggesting his intention to pull troops out of the country.161 Trump’s
decision to pull American troops out of Syria was in part a result of his talks with Turkish
President Recep Erdogan who was planning to invade Syria to attack the Syrian Kurdish
population. Trump, who ran on a platform of “America first” (prioritizing American
interests), made this decision despite the fact that Turkey has been explicit about its
desire to invade Northern Syria in order to go after the Kurds, who are American allies,
and create a place where they can send the millions of Syrian refugees who have fled to
Turkey since the beginning of the war.162 Turkey declared war against the Syrian Kurds
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because, according to Erdogan, the Kurdish fighters in Syria are connected to the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party within Turkey, which has perpetrated terrorist attacks in Turkey
for 30 years.163 Despite Erdogan’s claims, Syrian Kurdish fighters have never attacked
Turkey; in fact, the peaceful territory in Northern Syria that they control has actually
prevented extremist groups like ISIS from reaching Turkey.164 Nevertheless, Erdogan has
gone to great lengths to prevent a Kurdish autonomous state between Syria and Turkey.
President Trump was worried about the escalating violence in the region and wanted to
pull out U.S. troops, despite the implications for its Kurdish allies. According to one
advisor, “[Trump] doesn’t believe any of his advisers that tell him that [the Kurds] are in
jeopardy, that Erdogan will kill them.”165
On October 6th, 2019, President Trump withdrew around 50 U.S. soldiers who
had been fighting alongside Kurdish forces in Syria.166 Days later he pulled out the
remaining 1,000 U.S. troops who had been stationed in the country, completely
abandoning the Kurdish forces.167 This decision was met with considerable backlash from
both Republicans and Democrats in part because of the implications for the Syrian Kurds.
General James Mattis resigned from his position as Secretary of Defense in protest over
Trump’s decision. Later in October, President Trump decided to send a few hundred U.S.
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troops back to the country for the exclusive purpose of guarding oil fields in Syria.168 It is
worth noting that since 2014, there have been only four members of the U.S. military
killed in combat in Syria.169

Figure 1: 2015 Map of a divided Syria170
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CHAPTER 4: An Analysis of Debates about U.S. Policy
in Syria (2011-2022)
Chapter 4 will analyze the different arguments that have been made by
government officials and scholars regarding how U.S. policy towards Syria should have
been crafted beginning in 2011. This chapter will describe arguments made by Samantha
Power, Ben Rhodes, Max Boot, Hagar Chemali, and Fred Hof, to name just a few, and
will focus on the following questions: Was there anything that the U.S. could have done
to prevent Assad from escalating the war on his people? How should President Obama
have responded to Assad’s chemical weapons use? Were sanctions effective at deterring
Assad? What types of aggression should constitute a “red line”? Would no-fly zones have
been feasible and effective? Should President Trump have pulled troops out of Syria
when he did? And, to what extent should the U.S. use Syria to weaken Iran?
American Policy in Syria Before Chemical Weapons Usage
The main area of contention among experts regarding how the United States
should have responded to Assad’s violence leading up to his chemical weapons attacks
comes down to diplomacy versus military action. Syria experts such as Hagar Chemali,
the Director of Syria and Lebanon at the National Security Council between 2010 and
2012, believe that the United States should have pursued a military response to Assad’s
use of indiscriminate violence even before chemical weapons were officially
used.171Although she acknowledges this sort of policy was not politically feasible and
would have aligned more with President Bush’s Middle East policy than President
Obama’s, Chemali still believes that military action such as striking weapons depots or
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airways would have been the only way to deter Assad from pursuing further violence
against his citizens.172 “The only language Assad understands is the language of military
force,” explained Chemali in an interview.173 According to Chemali, the United States
realized that Assad would use indiscriminate violence against his citizens as early as
April 2011, and they should have preempted mass violence against civilians rather than
waiting for escalation to occur.174 Anyone who had studied the history of the Assad
regime in Syria should have been able to foresee that Bashar al-Assad was far more
concerned with staying in power than with the lives of his own people, Chemali
explained. Frederic Hof, the former U.S. Special Envoy to Syria under Obama, seems to
agree with Chemali that diplomacy was and remained largely unsuccessful in deterring
Assad throughout the conflict. Referencing the 2012 Geneva Final Communique, which
was an agreement between the UN Security Council members that would have allowed
for a peaceful transition of power in Syria (assuming both sides complied), Hof writes:
The preferred American route to political transition has been one of Syrian peace
negotiations under United Nations auspices…But the Assad regime rejected
Geneva, spurned political transition, and mocked substantive peace
negotiations.175
As Hof explains, the majority of diplomatic efforts to weaken or negotiate with Assad
did not prove successful, so it seems unlikely that they would have been effective in
stopping Assad towards the beginning of the war.
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There are a number of experts who disagree with Hof and Chemali and feel that
diplomacy might have effectively dissuaded Assad from his violent campaign against his
citizens. Robert Ford, U.S. Ambassador to Syria from 2011-2014, and Ben Rhodes,
President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor of the United States, are two of
these government officials who stress the importance of diplomacy. In his memoir,
Rhodes writes:
I am haunted by the question of whether some more assertive diplomatic
initiative could have avoided some of the violence to come, even if it didn’t
require Assad’s immediate ouster. We were counting on the building pressure on
Assad from within to be met with growing isolation from abroad in a way that
would cause his regime to crumble.176
Rhodes admits that he and the rest of the Obama administration underestimated Assad’s
resolve and strength.177 Earlier in his memoir, Rhodes does claim that he suggested
bombing Syrian airways and other regime infrastructure to Obama, to which the
President responded: “And what happens after we bomb the runways and Russia, Iran
and Assad rebuild them?” 178 Nevertheless, when reflecting on what could have been done
differently, Rhodes never argues that military action like that which he proposed to
President Obama was necessarily a better option than diplomacy. Similarly to Rhodes,
Robert Ford is quoted in an interview to have said:
We all learned from Iraq that regime change is not the way to bring about positive
political change. In the case of civil war, there needs to be negotiation between
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the opposition and the government. The question is how you increase the
likelihood that it will succeed.179
Ambassador Ford goes on to admit that neither the United States nor the rest of the
international community were able to facilitate successful negotiations between Assad
and the opposition, but he still maintains that diplomacy would have been the best option
had it been approached differently.180
It is certainly easier to come to this conclusion knowing what we know now, but it
definitely seems as though the only thing that would have prevented Assad from
escalating violence against his own people and ultimately using chemical weapons would
have been a military demonstration of the United States’ resolve early on in the conflict.
That being said, it is unsurprising that President Obama was not willing to demonstrate
his military will and become involved in another war in the Middle East after Libya and
Afghanistan.
The Red Line Incident
After some reflection on the past decade, the majority of scholars seem to
disagree with President Obama’s decision not to enforce his threat to Assad about
chemical weapons use. However, several government officials who worked under
Obama, along with the President himself, maintain that it was the right decision to pursue
a diplomatic response rather than air strikes in response to Assad’s crossing of President
Obama’s ”red line” threat given factors such as the political climate in the United States
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and the cost of a military intervention. President Obama, Ambassador Ford, and Ben
Rhodes all defend the President's decision to go to Congress for approval to pursue
airstrikes in Syria and then to ultimately back down from military action when it became
clear that Congress would not vote in favor of a military intervention in Syria. Samantha
Power, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, along with Hagar Chemali and
Frederic Hof all strongly believe that the United States made a grave mistake in not
enforcing the red line that chemical weapons constituted.
Ambassador Ford’s criticism of Obama’s Syria policy is different from that of
many other critics. He believes that the United States should never have established
chemical weapons as a red line in Syria given what he considers to be the United States’
lack of national security interest in the country. In a CNN interview, Ambassador Ford
remarked on the issue:
American rhetoric must be in harmony with American interests and determination
to back up its word. We spoke very sternly and were not willing to back it up. In
the end…Syria was not a national American security interest…We should not
threaten to change the balance of power of a foreign country somewhere if we are
not prepared to do it, and clearly if it is not a vital national security issue there
will be people in Washington who say wait, hold on, let's not escalate.
In President Obama’s final press conferences where he talked about his successes and
failures over his eight years in office, he said of the crisis in Syria: “Responsibility for
this brutality lies in one place alone, with the Assad regime and its allies, Russia and Iran,

Heath 43

and this blood and these atrocities are on their hands.”181 The wording of this statement
would certainly suggest that he absolves himself and the United States of any guilt. Later
in the press conference, President Obama is asked about any personal responsibility he
felt regarding Syria. He answered:
I always feel responsible. I felt responsible when kids were being shot by
snipers… I feel responsible for murder and slaughter that’s taken place in South
Sudan that’s not being reported on… There are places around the world where
horrible things are happening and because of my office, because I’m president of
the United States, I feel responsible.182
Here, President Obama misses an opportunity to specifically address his mistakes in
Syria. Instead, he brings up other conflicts, making it appear as though there is only so
much the President of the United States can do in the face of a world full of atrocities,
thereby absolving himself of responsibility. He does specifically address Syria later when
he talks about how his administration was unable to come up with a solution to weaken
Assad. He places the blame on the lack of support from Congress and the American
people for a military intervention in Syria.183 He explains:
Unless we were all in and willing to take over Syria, we were going to have
problems. And everything else was tempting because we wanted to do something
and it sounded like the right thing to do but it was going to be impossible to do

181

Smith, David. “Obama Reflects on Syria at Farewell Press Conference: 'I Always Feel Responsible'.”
The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 16 Dec. 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/16/obama-syria-assad-aleppo-final-press-conference.
182
Ibid.
183
Ibid.

Heath 44

this on the cheap. And in that circumstance, I have to make a decision as
President of the United States as to what is best. I’m sorry.184
However, as Frederic Hof points out, President Trump’s air strikes against chemical
weapons machinery in Syria did not lead to any sort of global conflict or even any deaths
of American soldiers or pilots. 185 Nowhere in his press conference does President Obama
specifically admit to making the wrong decision; he stands by his choices regarding
Syria, but he is apologetic about their outcomes.
Ben Rhodes emphasizes the importance that President Obama placed on the
political climate and feasibility of his options in his memoir. He explains: “At a meeting
on what he was aiming to accomplish in his first term, I pointed to the potential for a
democratic opening in Burma. ‘Ben,’ he said, ‘no one cares about Burma in Ohio.’ 186
Clearly Obama was at times more interested in re-election than in doing what was right.
President Obama’s lack of an apology is particularly notable given that President Bill
Clinton specifically called his decision not to intervene in Rwanda his “greatest
mistake.”187
Ben Rhodes has interesting insights on this debate because he worked closely
with President Obama while the President was crafting his Syria policy. Rhodes believes
that Congress’ pushback to airstrikes in Syria was politically motivated given that, “for
eight years, Republicans had defended Bush's ability to do whatever he pleased as
184
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commander-in-chief...Now they were suddenly devoted to constitutional limits on the
commander-in-chief.”188 Rhodes also helps us better understand President Obama’s
thought process regarding the decision to go to Congress, writing:
Obama talked about the different ways in which the debate can play out. ‘The
thing is’, he said, ‘if we lose this vote it will drive a stake through the heart of
neoconservatism, everyone will see they have no votes.’ I realized then that he
was comfortable with either outcome. If we won authorization, he'd be in a strong
position to act in Syria. If we didn't, then we would potentially end the cycle of
American wars of regime change in the Middle East.189
Throughout his description of President Obama’s decision-making process, Rhodes
suggests that at times he wishes Obama had followed through on his threats to Assad.
Ultimately, however, Rhodes defends Obama’s decision and praises the agreement with
Russia that in theory forced Assad to destroy his chemical weapons. Rhodes writes:
The Congressional vote never took place. Thousands of tons of chemical weapons
would be removed from Syria and destroyed, far more than could have been
destroyed by military action. The war would continue. Barack Obama would
continue to keep the United States out of it.190
Rhodes’ memoir was published in 2018, and there have been chemical weapons attacks
in Syria as recently as 2019 that Rhodes conveniently ignores. Hagar Chemali’s assertion
that “the only language Assad understands is the language of military force” rings true.
The diplomatic attempts of Russia and the United States were unsuccessful in deterring
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Assad, which is not ultimately surprising due to Russia’s vested interest in Assad
maintaining power.
Although she too worked for the Obama Administration in 2011, Hagar Chemali
maintains that the Obama Administration made a mistake in choosing not to follow
through on the red line threat. In response to people like Ben Rhodes who defend
Obama’s decision to go to Congress for approval, Chemali explains that the airstrikes that
President Obama had originally planned did not need to begin a prolonged military effort
in Syria; they could have lasted a night or two meaning that approval from Congress was
certainly not necessary.191 She explains that it is highly unlikely that the invasion would
have lasted longer than the 60 days after which Obama would have been constitutionally
required to get Congressional approval.192 The airstrikes would have functioned as a “slap
on the wrist” that proved to Assad that the United States was willing to use military force
if he continued murdering his civilians indiscriminately.193 Chemali criticizes President
Obama’s failure to respond, explaining: “It shows that we are not prepared to deal with
dictators and thugs when it comes to war. We don’t play by the same set of rules.”194
Apart from Assad’s continued use of chemical weapons on his people, Chemali points out
another consequence of the United States’ failure to follow through on the red line threat:
the U.S. government can no longer credibly make a threat like the one that President
Obama made against Assad. For example, when President Putin invaded Ukraine, a U.S.
government representative stated that the consequences would be severe if Putin were to
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use chemical weapons in Syria.195 The media has called this “another red line” and has
suggested that the U.S. government will not follow through once again.196
Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, is another
government official who worked closely with President Obama on his Syria policy.
Unlike Ben Rhodes, Power remains critical of Obama’s decision to pursue diplomacy
over military action in response to Assad’s chemical weapons usage. The first specific
criticism Power has of President Obama was his decision to wait for the United Nations
inspectors to confirm that chemical weapons had indeed been used in Syria, even after
the American intelligence community already strongly believed they had been used by
Assad. In her memoir, Power questions Obama’s motivation for turning to UN
intelligence, writing:
The Syrian regime had used chemical weapons. Assad was extremely unlikely to
allow UN inspectors anywhere near evidence of his culpability. Was the White
House in denial that the red line has been crossed? Or had President Obama
decided not to enforce his threat?197
Power was ultimately correct- Assad did not initially allow the UN investigators to enter
Syria. Due to this delayed entry, they were still in Syria when President Obama decided
to launch airstrikes (but was prevented from doing so because of the UN’s refusal to
leave).
With regards to Obama’s decision to go to Congress for approval for military
strikes, Power seems to agree with Rhodes that it was clear that Republicans were
195
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determined to oppose any policy that Obama proposed.198 She writes: “I regretted our
administration had not determined whether we had the votes before the president
announced he was going to Congress. Had he known he would fail, I did not believe he
would have chosen the path he did.”199 On the usefulness of diplomacy when dealing with
Assad, Power writes:
In my view diplomacy had been ineffective in part because Assad had become
convinced that no one would stop him from using even the most merciless tactics
against his own people. If the U.S. government looked away from this incident,
signaling that Assad could gas his citizens at will, I worried he would never feel
sufficient pressure to negotiate.”200
Like Chemali, Power also brings up the Obama administration’s lack of credibility
resulting from Obama’s failure to act, writing that:
It is undeniable that the perception of the un-enforced threat shadowed our
administration’s subsequent efforts to influence Assad and other actors in the war.
This moved us further away from the President’s aim and the regional and global
necessity of achieving a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.”201
It seems as though most of the American Syria apologists are those who worked
under President Obama during the Syrian Civil War, meaning that they have a vested
interest in defending their policies. However, former Obama government officials
Samantha Power and Hagar Chemali maintain that President Obama made the wrong
decision in pursuing a diplomatic solution over a military invasion in Syria. Given the
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current situation in Syria and the ineffectiveness of all of President Obama’s Syria
policies, it would seem as though officials like Power and Chemali were correct in their
thinking.
The Effectiveness of Sanctions
Sanctions were one of the key aspects of U.S. policy in Syria, although there has
been some debate regarding their effectiveness. According to Hagar Chemali, who has
referred to herself as the “architect of the Syrian sanctions,” the most effective of these
were multilateral oil sanctions where the United States worked with the European Union
to sanction Syrian oil.202 Since the United States has never imported Syrian oil, they had
to work with European nations on these sanctions. Chemali claims that Syria was losing
$400 million dollars a month due to these sanctions, which undermined the regime’s
ability to finance its “war machine.”203 Chemali explains that sanctions have never been a
“silver bullet” that would end the war, but they can often serve to bring the aggressor to
the negotiating table or dismantle the financial networks that support the perpetrator. She
explains that “they are meant to be one prong in a broader strategy.”204 Unfortunately,
Chemali laments, the sanctions in Syria never convinced Assad to negotiate. During the
first half of the Civil War, Assad was growing weaker, in part due to multilateral
sanctions. However, when the Russians decided to get involved in the war in 2015 and
back Assad both militarily and financially, the United States and European sanctions
were no longer as effective, Chemali admits.205 Samantha Power expresses strong
opinions on Syria sanctions in her memoir, writing that Assad was hardly affected at all
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by those implemented by the United States because the United Nations Security Council
was unable to impose multilateral sanctions across all member nations due to Russia’s
veto power.206 As a result, Assad would always have somewhere to store his money
(much of it was stored in Russia). Power again pointed to the futility of sanctions as a
policy option, writing: “If we responded with more of the same, I felt sure Assad's regime
would continue with more of the same.”207 While Chemali would disagree with Power
that sanctions were essentially futile, she would agree that they lost their effectiveness as
soon as Russia decided to put its full weight behind Assad. Today, the only way that
sanctions could prove effective would be if the United States’ new sanctions on Russia in
response to the invasion of Ukraine significantly hurt the Russian economy to the extent
that it has an effect on the Syrian economy as well.
What Should Constitute a Red Line?
There is a particularly interesting debate that has come out of discourse around
President Obama’s decision to impose a red line specifically for chemical weapons usage.
Even before Assad began using chemical weapons against his people, he was killing them
indiscriminately and in large numbers using other types of weapons such as Scud missiles
and barrel bombs. Both Samantha Power and Frederic Hof bring up the question of
whether other types of weapons and/or number of civilian deaths should also constitute a
red line. Hof writes:
By publicly highlighting chemical weapons use as the trigger for military
retaliation, the United States and its allies have inadvertently signaled to the
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Assad regime that other tools of mass terror—barrel bombs, field artillery,
rockets, Scud missiles, and conventional aerial bombs—are permissible. Mass
homicide should, as a matter of U.S. policy, be inadmissible regardless of the
murder weapon.208
Power feels similarly to Hof, but she does believe that chemical weapons:
warranted a specific red line. They were weapons of mass destruction, capable of
killing a vast number of people at once. The nations of the world had come
together after World War I to ban these weapons, and if the international
consensus against their use were to break down, the labs would almost certainly
come back to haunt many more people in and out of conflict zones around the
world.209
That being said, Power points out that in making chemical weapons a red line issue,
“Assad could reasonably conclude that, going forward, he could starve his people into
submission, carpet bomb hospitals and schools… all without the United States doing
much to stop him.”210 Of course, President Obama's failure to enforce his red line against
chemical weapons meant that Assad could also conclude that he should feel free to
continue using this type of weapon on his people without fear of international
intervention. Power also makes an interesting point when she writes about the UN
Security Council resolution that she supported, which in theory forced Assad to destroy
his chemical weapons. She writes:
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I could not shake the concern that the Council was implicitly licensing other
kinds of attacks on civilians. Because Russia refused to include references to
SCUD missiles, artillery, barrel bombs and even napalm, the resolution was silent
on Assad’s other murderous weapons. This resolution was not enough. Two days
after its passage, a regime airstrike would kill 14 people, most of them children on
their first day of school.211
This specific question of what should constitute a “red line” is not one that has
been as widely discussed as the question of how President Obama should have reacted to
Assad’s crossing of the chemical weapons red line; nevertheless, it is worth exploring. Of
course, chemical weapons are particularly deadly, but dictators like Assad are more than
capable of killing just as many people with other types of weapons, and the international
community and the United States specifically should perhaps determine another type of
red line that speaks to number of deaths rather than the murder weapon or the ethnicity of
the people being killed.
The Debate Over No-Fly Zones
One common debate in Syria policy was whether or not the United States should
impose a no-fly zone in Syria, which would have acted as a deterrent to attacks from both
ISIS and the Assad regime. Prominent government officials such as Hillary Clinton and
Secretary of State John Kerry spoke out in support of establishing these no fly-zones,
monitored by the U.S. military, but many others including President Obama were quite
opposed to the idea, and they were never implemented. According to Karl Mueller, a
political scientist at RAND, there are two main reasons why the U.S. government might
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have considered no-fly zones: they could have created a “safe zone” for Syrian civilians
who would otherwise have become refugees and contributed to the growing refugee
problem in neighboring countries and Europe; additionally, no-fly zones may have
provided a sheltered area where the Syrian opposition could have trained.212 That being
said, the United Nations never would have supported this type of intervention if Russia
thought that it would help rebel forces.213 Mueller points out that this would mean that
any members of the opposition forces would be turned away if they tried to enter the safe
zones, even if just to seek refuge as a civilian.214 Mueller also explains that the no-fly
zone proposals have generally included more than just monitoring of the skies and a
threat against Assad’s bombing of his civilians (After all, ISIS has never had air
capabilities); the proposals also included ground forces to guard the borders of the safe
zones.215 Dennis Ross, an influential former Middle East advisor to President Obama,
suggested that Turkey provide the ground troops and the United States provide the air
support, which seemed to be a good compromise.216
Despite the clear benefits of some form of no-fly zone, the argument against them
was ultimately more convincing to President Obama. The main pushback against these
enforced safe zones was (and remains) that they would escalate conflict with the Syrian
army and the Russia military presence in Syria. Max Boot, a national security expert at
the Washington Post, originally supported no-fly zones but changed his mind after Russia
became heavily involved in support of Assad. He writes:
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In 2012, I joined many others in calling for the United States to enforce a no-fly
zone to stop the rain of Assad’s barbaric “barrel bombs” and to provide aid to the
Free Syrian Army to overthrow him. A lot more people might be alive today if
President Barack Obama had listened, and a strategic and humanitarian disaster
might have been averted. But… I no longer think that advice makes sense now.
Russia got involved in Syria in 2015, and the United States can’t attack Russian
aircraft without risking a war.217
In response to this type of argument, it is important to recall that Israel has entered Syrian
air fields numerous times to strike weapons depots or carry out assassinations, and only
one of their planes has ever been shot down.218 That being said, given the uniquely tense
relationship between Russia and the United States, many experts correctly have expressed
worry about escalating the conflict today.
The Debate Over Pulling Troops Out of Syria
President Trump’s decision to pull American troops out of Syria proved extremely
unpopular with many members of the U.S. national security community. This pushback
over Trump’s decision was largely due to its effect on the Kurdish population in Syria
that has proven to be a crucial ally to the United States in the fight against the Islamic
State. Hagar Chemali argues that not only did we hurt the Kurds, we also weakened our
relationship with all current and potential future allies to the United States who can no
longer be sure they can trust us.219 Chemali also points out how poorly it reflects on the
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United States that President Trump sent back a small number of troops to Syria for the
explicit purpose of protecting not our allies but the oil fields.220
There are, however, members of the U.S. government that supported Trump’s
decision to remove troops from Syria. Robert Ford says of the decision:
The reason I think it's the best course of action [removing troops] is that the
American soldiers there have done about as much as they can in terms of reducing
ISIS's capacity to threaten the United States. To totally eradicate ISIS, that's really
a job that only Syrians, not American soldiers, can do. 221
Ford completely ignores the United States’ commitment to our Kurdish allies as well as
the hundreds of thousands of Syrians dying at the hands of Assad. Mark Esper, President
Trump’s Defense Secretary, was another defender of President Trump’s decision,
claiming that removing a small number of American troops was not actually letting down
our Kurdish allies because several hundred American soldiers were not going to stop an
invasion from Turkey. That being said, Esper does not acknowledge the symbolic effect
of removing U.S. troops from Syria. Turkey was certainly less likely to attack the Syrian
Kurds if it meant endangering American lives given that Turkey and the United States are
NATO allies.
Joshua Landis, a well-known expert on Syria at the University of Oklahoma, also
agrees with Trump’s decision, claiming that “Trump’s instinct to keep the US from
establishing a permanent role in Syria is fundamentally correct, in my estimation.”222
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Landis actually directly opposes U.S. support for the Syrian Kurds. He goes as far as to
state that “the U.S. would be committing a grave mistake should it try to build a viable
state in North Syria for the Kurds.”223 He backs up this claim by explaining that the
region in Northern Syria that is inhabited by both Kurds and Arabs is poor and filled with
ethnic tensions and conflict that has arisen from their “diametrically opposed national
ambitions” and years of war.224 Landis believes that the United States should help the
Syrian Kurds negotiate a deal with Assad and unite against Turkey and the Islamic state,
their common enemies.225 He explains that “Washington has the leverage in Syria to make
such an agreement last and to help the Kurds; it does not have the leverage to depose
Assad or roll back Iran.”226 Landis worries that if the United States continues to support
the Syrian Kurds then Assad and Erdogan will become allies and will be a danger to both
the United States and the Kurdish goal of state-building .227
In reality, Assad and Erdogan are and have been foes for the duration of the war
and there is more danger of Turkey attacking the Syrian Kurds than of Turkey and Assad
ever joining forces. The United States made a commitment to its allies and then broke
that commitment despite losing very few American lives in Syria. Pulling American
troops out of Syria also signaled to Assad that the United States is no longer interested in
the conflict and gave him the green light to continue massacring his people.
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CHAPTER 5: U.S. Policy in Syria Going Forward
This chapter will examine several debates about the role that the United States can
play in Syria going forward in order to answer the question of whether there is any hope
of a liberal democracy returning to Syria and what the role of the United States can be in
this transition. The current U.S. President, Joe Biden, has yet to engage with the conflict
in Syria or propose any concrete Syria policy, and given the ongoing Russian invasion of
Ukraine, it seems that the Biden administration has put Syria on the backburner. Below is
a map of Syria from November of 2019 that shows the new political makeup of Syria and
how the territory is divided.
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Figure 2: Territorial Divide of Syria in 2019228
The Debate over a Proxy War with Iran
When considering U.S. policy in Syria, several experts and scholars have
suggested that the United States should take advantage of Iran’s heavy involvement in the
Syrian conflict to weaken their influence given that Iran is the United States’ biggest foe
in the region. Kenneth Pollack, a former member of the National Security Council, and
Joshua Landis hold opposing views on this topic. Pollack has written that “Syria is the
ideal place for the United States to take on Iran.”229 He supports this view by pointing out
that as of 2018, when his article was written, Iran had lost an estimated 2,000 of their
own troops in the war in Syria, and the war was costing them between $15 billion to $20
billion dollars every year.230 This means that Iran’s Syria commitment is taking up almost
20 percent of their defense budget.231 Pollack claims that these high costs contributed to
the strong anti-regime sentiments that ultimately caused the protests at the end of 2017 in
Iran.232 Pollack reminds us that Iran has a strong incentive to remain in the war
supporting Assad given its fear of Sunni dominance in the Middle East. He writes:
It strikes me that the right American response is to make sure that [Iranians] aren’t
left alone to complete the pacification of Syria anytime soon — that their foes are
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armed, trained, and supplied to allow them to persevere and to keep bleeding the
Iranians and their allies.233
Pollack believes that the best way to continue to weaken Iran is to create a more
robust training program for “all but the absolute worst Syrian opposition figures.”234 He
claims that the United States should not worry about arming and training fighters
affiliated with the Islamic state because “the vast majority of foreign fighters who have
returned to Europe from fighting with Salafi Jihadist groups have returned to normal lives
and [given] up violence entirely.”235 Pollack attributes this to the fact that many people
join extremist organizations like the Islamic State due to the opportunities for money or
glory that the groups offer.236 But, he writes “their decisions are based on their situations,
and when their situations change, so too will their allegiances and beliefs.”237 Whether or
not this would play out in Syria if Assad were ousted is still to be seen. It’s difficult to
determine whether this pattern has held up in Syria given that a majority of ISIS fighters
have been killed and have not been given an opportunity to leave the organization.
Joshua Landis strongly disagrees with Pollack on the benefits of using the conflict
in Syria to weaken Iran. He believes that it would be “neither wise nor humanitarian” to
escalate the conflict any further in Syria given the effect it would have on Syrian citizens,
even if the United States might be able to weaken Iran in the process.238 He writes:
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Washington should admit its losses and stop further efforts to defeat Iran or
Russia in the region. It should allow these powers to rebuild the region. The U.S.
does not have to cooperate with Assad in rebuilding… but it should allow the
region to stabilize and revive on its own, finding help where it can.
In other words, due to the detrimental impact that the Syrian Civil War has had on
Syrians, the United States should not involve itself in the conflict in Syria with the
explicit purpose of weakening Iran because this would not be fair to the millions of
Syrians who have been displaced or lost their lives in this war. Going forward, Landis
believes that the United States should “recognize that Iran has won this war, and [the
U.S.] must come to terms with the fact that it was its own policies that were largely
responsible for that victory.”239
Half a decade ago, Pollack’s vision of U.S. involvement in Syria might have been
feasible. If the U.S. government had been looking for a compelling way to convince the
American people to increase U.S. military involvement in Syria, they could have taken
advantage of the strong anti-Iran sentiment in the United States and pointed to Iran’s
influence in Syria and the opportunity that provided. That being said, given the state of
the opposition movement in Syria, the Russian commitment to the conflict, and the fact
that the vast majority of U.S. troops have been sent home, it seems unlikely that increased
involvement in the conflict will be feasible unless we are willing to put a large number of
American lives at risk. Arming the opposition is no longer a practical U.S. policy option
because the opposition has been so thoroughly weakened. As the next section of this
paper will touch on, we should not follow Landis’s advice to allow Iran, Russia, and
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China to rebuild the region. Sanctions must be placed on those countries that are
supportive of the Assad regime and will invest in the country’s growth following the war.
From my analysis, neither Landis nor Pollack offer pragmatic or effective policy
suggestions given the current political climate in Syria. Any policy that supports Assad
maintaining power (such as allowing other countries to invest in the country) is
antithetical to a peaceful future for Syria, as the next section will explain.
Should We Let Assad Win?
As this paper has touched on, there are scholars such as Joshua Landis who
believe that allowing Assad to win the war would be the best way to end the death and
suffering that has plagued Syria for over a decade. This is a perspective shared by Max
Boot, who has written: “The way to save lives, I’ve sadly concluded, is to let Assad win
as quickly as possible.”240 In response to arguments like these, Fred Hof counters that
The objective of the United States in Syria must be a full political transition from
criminal, terrorist rule by family and entourage to a consensual, legitimate system
featuring rule of law. Absent this transition, other important goals [such as]... an
end to armed conflict, protection of civilians from state and Islamist terror, the
return of over six million refugees, sustained tranquility and reconstruction—will
be very difficult or impossible to achieve.241
Hof claims that if we wish to improve the lives of Syrians, we must fight for regime
change rather than simply allowing Assad to win, which would end the war but not the
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dictatorship and oppression. In response, Boot points to pictures that have been
circulating showing happy civilians in re-built public parks in Aleppo now that Assad has
defeated the rebels in the city. He writes: “It’s terrible that they have to live under Assad,
but at least they’re alive. Tyranny is preferable to endless and useless war.”242 In a direct
response to this statement, Michael Rubin, a researcher at the American Enterprise
Institute, counters that “more than a half million Syrians are not strolling in public parks
but are buried under them because of Assad’s ethnic and sectarian cleansing.” 243 Rubin
questions whether it would have been morally correct to appease Hitler in order to save
the lives of millions of Allied soldiers and civilians who ultimately died in WWII. 244 “To
Save Brits, Let Hitler Win”, Rubin quips.245 Rubin also points out that allowing Assad to
win would “signal to any dictator that if only he employed enough brutality against his
population, no matter what the regional impact, he could have his cake and eat it too.”246
He implores U.S. policy makers to “not create a self-fulfilling prophecy in which we urge
abandonment of anti-Assad Syrians and then complain that they don’t have enough
support to win.”247
This disagreement between Rubin and Boot is perhaps the most important and
frustrating debate about the present-day American role in the Syrian Civil War. Given the
current political climate in Syria, Rubin’s argument is entirely idealistic. That having
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been said, he is correct that even if the war ends, Assad will remain a ruthless, corrupt
dictator. Even before Syria entered a state of war, Assad was not above torturing and
killing innocent teenagers. Hamza al-Khateeb was a particularly notable case. Hamza was
a 13-year-old boy who was arrested by the regime in some of the earliest protests in April
2011 that ultimately led to the Civil War. His body, which showed clear signs of brutal
torture, was returned to his family one month later.248 Hamza was one of thirteen people
whose mutilated bodies were returned from the prison a month after that specific protest.
Thousands of innocent people followed in the decade to come. If the Assad regime is
willing to go to such terrible lengths to suppress opposition even when the country is not
at war, it is hard to understand how Max Boot can suggest that letting Assad win would
bring peace to Syria. There will always be a Sunni majority in the country who will
oppose him, which means that Assad will continue using brutal repression tactics until
every person who dares speak out against the regime has been forced to leave the country,
tortured or killed. Additionally, Hof is absolutely correct that many of the other problems
plaguing Syria, such as the Islamic state, extreme poverty, and the refugee crisis, are a
direct result of the Assad regime remaining in power. Allowing Assad to win the war
would not solve any of these issues.
While it is clear that Assad remaining in power will never bring peace to Syria,
there are not currently any feasible policy solutions that the United States can implement
that would result in Assad giving up power. Assad knows that if he loses power, he will
either be killed immediately or arrested for life, not unlike Gaddafi’s fate in Libya.249
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Given the life or death nature of his position, he will go to great lengths to stay in power,
as we can see given the atrocious acts of murder he has committed over the past 11
years). Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State under President Trump, articulated his
proposed Syria Policy in 2018, although it was ultimately ignored by President Trump.
Tillerson stated in a speech that “a stable, unified and independent Syria ultimately
requires post-Assad leadership in order to be successful.”250 One of the specific
components of his Syria policy involved “[rallying] the Syrian people and individuals
within the regime to compel Assad to step down.” 251 Tillerson ignores the obvious, which
is that the Syrian people have been “rallying” for over a decade. They are about as
convinced as they have ever been that Assad needs to leave power. But, members of the
regime are certainly not going to abandon Assad. Many of them have been supporting the
Assad family since Hafez al-Assad was in power.252 Just like Assad, they know they will
face serious repercussions if he were to lose power. Tillerson fails to propose a specific
policy that would significantly change the course of the Civil War in any meaningful way.
Perhaps when Tillerson spoke about “rallying”, he was referring to the opposition’s
inability to work together to defeat Assad, but this is a cultural issue within Syria that the
United States is unlikely to solve through any given policy. Earlier in the conflict, the
United States tried to help the different opposition groups work together, but they were
unsuccessful. Even before the start of the Syrian Civil War, Assad was cultivating a
culture of distrust and an “every man for himself” mentality among Syrians. Additionally,
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most Syrians have not had a liberal democracy in their lifetime, so “rallying” to create
one would not be so simple.
Ultimately, the United States is not currently in a good position to depose Assad
or convince him to leave. Both Assad and Putin are deeply invested in Assad’s survival as
leader of Syria. Russia would never allow democratic elections in Syria if it might mean
that the new President could be friendly to the United States and represent U.S. interests.
The United States will never be as invested as Russia is in this conflict. Before Russia
became so heavily involved in 2015, the United States had a real opportunity to change
the course of the war. Now that the United States has pulled most of its troops from the
country and the regime is in control of most of the country, there is essentially no policy
that the United States could implement that would lead to Assad losing power. For eleven
years, the United States along with the international community have been trying
diplomatic solutions to convince Assad to give up power, and none has been successful.
It seems as though the only way that Assad will leave power would be if a country
offered him asylum and impunity if he agrees to step down. Given that he is a war
criminal, most countries would not be interested in pursuing this solution. It is also
unclear if Assad even has any interest in giving up power given that he benefits
financially from being in power. As of 2012, he had a fortune of an estimated $1.5 billion
dollars.253 If Assad did leave the country, there is also some uncertainty regarding who
would take his place. There is a strong possibility that it would be someone connected to
the Assad regime such as Assad’s corrupt cousin, Rami Makhlouf, who may be even
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more repressive and ruthless than Assad himself. Given that the United States has lost
credibility in Syria, it would not be in a position to oversee democratic elections in the
country. The United Nations would be the only body that could supervise elections, and
the UN has not historically been successful in creating any real change in Syria given that
Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council.
Biden’s Syria Policy
The Biden Administration has not implemented or proposed a concrete Syria
policy, but it has reiterated its support for UN Resolution 2254, adopted in 2015. This
resolution proposes a transitional government. It reads:
[The Resolution] expresses its support…for a Syrian-led political process that is
facilitated by the United Nations and, within a target of six months, establishes
credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process
for drafting a new constitution, and further expresses its support for free and fair
elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held within 18 months and
administered under supervision of the United Nations.254
Despite claiming to support the resolution, the Biden Administration has not taken any
steps to promote a political transition in Syria. That being said, it is unlikely that there are
any feasible U.S. policy options that would facilitate this transition anyway. Given that
the UN has been trying to encourage a transitional government in Syria since 2015 and
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has been unsuccessful, it is improbable that a diplomatic approach to this conflict will be
effective, even under American leadership.
One particular issue that the United States needs to address is the concern that
Assad’s leadership is becoming increasingly accepted in the international community. For
example, Interpol (The International Criminal Police Organization), recently reinstated
Syria as a member organization, meaning that Assad can issue arrest warrants in other
countries, putting millions of Syrian refugees who have opposed the government in
danger.255 Give that Assad himself is clearly a war criminal, this was a strange decision
for Interpol to make. The World Health Organization also decided in 2021 to bring Syria
onto its Executive Board, regardless of the fact that the Assad regime has bombed
hospitals and committed countless other atrocities on its civilian population.256 The
United States cannot follow in the footsteps of these groups and begin normalizing
relations with Syria. Neither can the United States allow countries like Russia, Iran and
China to support the rebuilding of Syria after the war, which would contribute to the
acceptance of the Assad regime both internally and on the international stage. The United
States must sanction any country that attempts to invest in Syria, as is stipulated under the
Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019. 257
The United States must work to alleviate suffering in Syria to the best of its
ability given that deposing Assad is no longer an option. The U.S. government should
increase its refugee quota and take some of the burden off of Turkey, which has accepted
255
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over half of all Syrian refugees. Additionally, the United States must continue to support
the international norm against the use of chemical weapons and consider imposing new
standards that consider the number of civilian deaths rather than the weapons used to kill
them.
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Concluding Remarks
Given the relative military power and capabilities of the United States, the U.S.
government had the responsibility to protect the Syrian people from Bashar al-Assad yet
continuously failed to do so. The war has been underway for over a decade now, and over
half a million people have been killed. Because the U.S. government failed to act, even
after it promised to do so, it missed its opportunity to influence the trajectory of the Civil
war. Prolonging intervention is almost never effective, and decisive military action can
sometimes be the best policy, as it would have been in Syria.
Through analyzing the development of U.S. Foreign Policy in Syria during the
ongoing Civil War, this thesis has attempted to determine how the United States could
have better prevented the mass atrocities that occurred under the Assad regime. Chapter 1
introduced the conflict and aimed to convince the reader why they should be concerned
with the conflict in Syria, highlighting the humanitarian and refugee crisis that it has
created over the past eleven years. This chapter also gave background into the history of
U.S.-Syria relations prior to 2011. Chapter 2 delved into the causes of the Civil War in
Syria beginning in 2011, describing the rise of the opposition movement and Assad’s
violent means of crushing protests. Chapter 2 also discussed the crucial role that Russia,
Iran and China have played in Assad’s ability to maintain power. Without Putin’s military
and financial support, it is unlikely that Assad would have been able to regain territory in
Syria to the extent that he has today. Chapter 3 describes the development of U.S. Policy
towards Assad, beginning with an explanation of the geopolitical factors that influenced
President Obama’s Middle East Policy. The legacies of the Libyan and Iraq wars
specifically had the largest impact on President Obama’s Syria policy: the American
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people had little appetite for further failed wars in the Middle East as a result. This
chapter focuses on the Obama administration’s infamous red line threat decision, which
implicitly told Assad that the United States was not militarily resolved to intervene in the
conflict. This paved the way for Assad’s continued aggressions against his people, which
largely went unpunished until President Trump launched airstrikes in response to
chemical weapon attacks in 2018.
Analysis of popular debates about American policy in Syria in Chapter 4 indicates
that rather than relying on diplomacy in the form of sanctions and strong statements, the
United States should have taken more decisive military action, perhaps even before
Assad began using chemical weapons. Additionally, this chapter suggests that the United
States and the international community should reconsider what constitutes a “red line”
given that dictators like Assad are capable of killing the same number of people with
chemical weapons as they are with barrel bombs. The final chapter presents a bleak
outlook on the future of Syria and the possibilities for effective U.S. policy that would
depose Assad and end the War. Assad will stop at nothing to remain in power, yet as long
as he is in power, Syrians will see no peace.
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